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Ohio Unemployment Compensation
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - COMPULSORY
RETIREMENT - RIGHT TO BENEFITS
Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc. 41
205 N.E.2d 608 (C.P. 1964).
The claimant, an employee of the Columbus Coated Fabrics
Company, was retired under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by his union and employer. Although the
contract contained no specific retirement provisions, there was a
general section in the agreement to the effect that the employer
had the right to force retirement at age 65.' The claimant filed
for unemployment compensation benefits upon retirement.2 The
Administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation al-
lowed the claim after a finding that the claimant had been "in-
voluntarily separated" from his job due to age, thereby bringing
him within the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act.?
A subsequent appeal by the employer to the Board of Review
of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation resulted in a finding
that the claimant had "voluntarily quit" his employment without
just cause, and therefore he was denied any benefits.' A further ap-
peal by the claimant was refused by the Board of Review. From
that refusal, an appeal was brought by the claimant and the Admin-
istrator to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County. The
issue presented to the court was whether the claimant was ineligible
for unemployment compensation benefits under section 4141.29
(D) (2) (a) of the Ohio Revised Code after being retired under
the terms of a union contract providing for a pension.5 The court
held that claimant had been discharged for cause8 and thus was in-
1. In Leach, the right of the employer to force retirement within the terms of the
union agreement was subject to yearly continuances granted upon certain conditions
established by the employer. Claimant was retired December 31, 1961, at the age of
69. Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc. 41, 44 (C.P. 1964), 205
N.E.2d 608, 610 (1964).
2. The claimant's action was in compliance with the requirements set forth in the Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Act. Orio REV. CODE §§ 4141.01-.99.
3. The Administrator, upon reconsideration, had refused an argument by the em-
ployer that claimant had quit voluntarily without just cause. Leach v. Columbus Coated
Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc. 41, 42 (C.P. 1964), 205, N.E.2d 608, 609 (1964).
4. Ibid. The appeal procedure is specifically set out within the statute. OIio REV.
CODE 5 4141.28.
5. Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc. 41-43 (C.P. 1964), 205
N.E.2d 608, 609 (1964).
6. Id. at 48. Specifically, the court held claimant to have been "discharged for cause
in connection with his work... within the purview of section 4141.29(D) (2) (a)
of the OHIo REV. CODE.
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eligible for such benefits. By accepting the "fruits" of the union
contract, which were greater than the benefits provided by the unem-
ployment compensation statute, the court held that the case did not
fall within the prohibitions of section 4141.32, forbidding a waiver
of benefits, and that the claimant had thereby given his employer
just cause for dismissal The court reasoned that the claimant had
"substituted" the pension benefits gained under the union contract
for the benefits granted by the unemployment compensation statute.
A major problem in all jurisdictions that have ruled on a fac-
tual situation similar to that in Leach is the provision in each state
code prohibiting a waiver of benefits by an employee.8 Typically,
such a non-waiver section is a statement of public policy set forth
by the legislature to insure that the benefits conferred by the unem-
ployment compensation statute are neither directly nor indirectly in-
fringed. In Ohio,9 as in other jurisdictions,1" this prohibition has
been held to include provisions in collective bargaining agreements
relating to unemployment compensation benefits.
The jurisdictions denying unemployment benefits to an employee
retired under a union contract providing pension benefits have con-
sistently followed Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co." There, a
Minnesota court relied heavily on the "agency-contract" principle
in considering the effect of a union contract. It determined that
the employees' separations were voluntary because they resulted
from the acts of their duly selected bargaining agents. As to the
issue of waiver of benefits, the court reasoned that the union agree-
ment provided for voluntary termination of employment and thus
was not in conflict with the statute. 2 On the other hand, Campbell
Soup Co. v. Board of Review" held that such a separation was in-
7. Id. at 48. This holding emphasized that through the acceptance of these pension
benefits, claimant had not "waived" his statutory benefits under section 4141.32 which
reads in part: "No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to benefits is valid,
nor shall benefits be assigned, released, or commuted." OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.32.
8. See, e.g., note 7 supra; see generally ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 244 (1958); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-734, 735 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1558 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 341.470(1), (3) (1963); MAss. ANN. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 35
(1957); MINN. STAT. § 268.17 (1959); N.J. STAT, ANN. § 43:21-15 (Supp. 1962);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 861 (1964).
9. Dahman v. Commercial Shearing & Stamping Co., 170 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio C.P.
1960); 54 OHIO JUR. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 33 (1962).
10. E.g., Philadelphia Transp. Co. v. Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 91, 155 A.2d
377 (1959).
11. 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958).
12. Id. at 72, 89 N.W.2d at 177-78; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.17 (1959).
13. 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953).
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voluntary in the statutory sense. In reaching this decision, the court
considered the employee's will and intention at the time of termina-
tion, concluding therefrom that the separation could not be volun-
tary since the employee did not choose to relinquish his job. Con-
sidering the non-waiver of benefits section of the statute, 4 the court
decided that although the union contract could not be brought
within the literal wording of the section, the agreement in effect
amounted to an advance surrender of benefits."
The opposing policies of the above two views are irreconcilable.
Those jurisdictions denying benefits emphasize the importance of
the union contract and ignore the non-waiver provision, while those
granting benefits stress the employee's actual intent at the time of
separation as well as the non-waiver provision. In Ohio, an em-
ployee's rights to unemployment compensation benefits are deter-
mined by the provisions of the act rather than by an agreement be-
tween the employer and employee or union."0 Specifically, it has
been held in Ohio that unemployment compensation benefits are
not to be made the subject of collective bargaining agreements.'7
The decision in the Leach case therefore raises a conflict in Ohio
decisional law regarding this question. In Ferrelli v. Leach,'" an-
other recent common pleas court decision, the court held, in a fac-
tual situation identical to Leach, that termination of employment
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-15 (Supp. 1962).
15. The split in jurisdictions deciding whether to grant or deny benefits to an em-
ployee retired under the terms of a union contract has been increased by subsequent
decisions. Denying benefits: Ball Bros. Co. v. Review Bd., 189 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. App.
1963); Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'a v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 352 S.W.2d 212
(Ky. 1961). In Kentucky, as opposed to the other states, the employees were merely
permitted to take part in the pension plan. Granting benefits: Employment Security
Comm'n v. Magma Copper Co., 90 Ariz. 104, 366 P.2d 84 (1961); Warner Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959);
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Thorne, 41 Ala. App. 331, 133 So. 2d 709, cert. denied, 272
Ala. 709, 133 So. 2d 713 (1961). In 1958, a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Iamont v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 337 Mass.
328, 149 N.E.2d 372 (1958), denying benefits, was swiftly rendered null and void by
amendment to the Massachusetts statute: "An individual shall not be disqualified under
the provisions of this subsection from receiving benefits by reason of leaving his work
under the terms of a pension program requiring retirement from employment, notwith-
standing his prior assent, direct or indirect, to the establishment of such pension pro.
gram." MAss. ANN. GEN. LAws ch. 151A, § 25 (e) (Supp. 1964).
16. Knowles v. Roberts, 117 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); 54 OHIo JuR. 2d
Unemployment Compensation § 33 (1962).
17. Dahman v. Commercial Shearing & Stamping Co., 170 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio C.P.
1960).
18. 186 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio C.P. 1962). In Ferrelli, however, the court relied upon
a different clause to interpret section 4141-29 (D) (2) (a) ("quit his work without just
cause....") than that relied on in Leach ("dismissed for just cause in connection with
his work. ...") Id. at 868.
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